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THE STRENGTH OF NUMBERS:
ENUMERATING COMMUNITIES IN INDIA'S
PRINCELY STATES*
Dick Kooiman
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam & CASA
OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS AN INCREASING AWARENESS OF THEimportance of numbers and figures has crept into our study of history.I am not referring to the so-called quantitative history which only feels
free to make statements about the past if sufficiently buttressed with
countable facts and data. What I mean is that historians have begun to realise
that modern government methods of measuring and counting have affected
the formation of new subjective identities. Bernard Cohn1 has already drawn
attention to the way colonial officials in India developed numerical
classifications of castes and communities for reasons of administrative
convenience. More recently Dipesh Chakrabarty argued that people adapted
themselves to these bureaucratic classifications, as they realised that the
numerical strength of their community had become an important political
asset.2
In this short essay I will investigate how the collection of official and
quantitative data affected group solidarities and inspired people from
different castes and religions to compete for what they thought to be a 'fair
number' of appointments in an ever-growing state bureaucracy. The focus
will be on three Indian princely states - Travancore, Baroda and Hyderabad -
and a related question will be whether the development of communal
I acknowledge in gratitude the valuable comments on an earlier draft received from James
Chiriyankandath (London), Ghanshyam Shah (Surat) and Frank de Zwart (Leiden).
1 Bernard S. Cohn, 'Notes on the History of the Study of Indian Society and Culture', in An
Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays (Delhi, 1987), pp. 136-72.
2
 Dipesh Chakrabarty, 'Modernity and Ethnicity in India', South Asia, Vol. XVII, Special Issue (1994),
pp. 143-55 .
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animosities in these semi-autonomous Indian states was any different from the
communalism in the directly administered British territories.
Cohn was one of the first to point out that the official view of caste was
closely related to how the British collected information about the caste
system. A caste was viewed as a concrete and measurable entity. It had
definable characteristics, such as endogamy, rituals, which could be found out
with the help of questionnaires and quantified for ethnographic reports and
surveys. Cohn quoted a 1901 government of India report which justified the
effort and expense of ethnographic surveys on the ground that 'India is a vast
storehouse of social and physical data which only need be recorded in order
to contribute to the solution of the problems ...'3
Dipesh Chakrabarty, arguing along similar lines, is of the opinion that
the most far-reaching and fundamental innovation that the British introduced
to Indian society was the establishment of a modern state. But state and
statistics are - not only etymologically - two sides of the same coin, and the
most conspicuous symptom of that state's modernity was that its techniques
of government were closely tied to techniques of measurement The British
had the length and breadth of India, her history, society and population,
mapped, classified and quantified in detail, most dramatically so in the
decennial Indian Census that began in 1872.4 As the colonial state had defined
India as a society made up by various religions and castes, these categories
came to dominate the Census operations.
The counting of Hindus, Muslims and others became a critical political
exercise when the British, gradually and hesitantly, began to include their
Indian subjects in legislative bodies and the higher ranks of the services. What
made this counting critical was that the British had decided to dispense
political privilege like seats and appointments along lines of caste and
religion. Whereas several authors allege that the colonial government was led
by considerations of divide and rule, Chakrabarty admits that the British may
have been prompted by a concern to be fair to the many caste and religious
communities they had so scrupulously counted and measured.
However that may be, the official classifications and their quantitative
content reconstituted the meaning of community. They imparted Indians with
the important message that communities could be enumerated and that their
number was politically important. Furthermore, their social and economic
progress or backwardness could be determined by measuring their share in the
number of graduates, official appointments and parliamentary seats.5 I would
like to add that these numerical classifications could also provide interested
3
 Cohn, op. cit., p. 157.
4 Chakrabarty, op. cit., p. 147.
5
 Ibid., p. 150.
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THE STRENGTH OF NUMBERS 83
leaders with an argument to start political action in order to secure a larger
share of these government benefits. Since a larger share for one community
necessarily involved a relative loss to another, an increase in communal
rivalry might be the final result. These communal incidents were extremely
disadvantageous to the emerging national movement in India.
In its earlier manifestations nationalism, in India as well as elsewhere,
was not aimed at the immediate establishment of an independent nation-state.
Rather, the first nationalists questioned their exclusion from positions of
power and demanded a larger participation of qualified Indians in the colonial
administration. The 1833 Charter had made Indians eligible to all posts, but
in the second part of the century they still had to fight their way up to the few
leading positions open to them. The main beneficiaries of a cautious entree to
higher office were members of the traditional elite. Brahmans, realising that
English education was the key to government employment, perpetuated their
predominance under British rule and controlled the several branches of public
administration.6 Their call for an Indianisation of the services rallied the
educated elite versus the colonial power in a well-arranged opposition of
Indians versus Europeans. However, with the expansion of government
services and the entrance of intermediate castes into schools and colleges, the
Indian ranks became ridden by mutual rivalry for the few available positions.
The claim for a rightful share was raised and here numbers came in as
evidence to demonstrate a community's proud achievement or unjustified
neglect.
The considerations presented so far, as is usual in so many studies in
Indian history, almost exclusively pertain to the situation in British India, that
is the territories under direct colonial rule. Yet, about two-fifths of Indian
territory and somewhat less than one-fourth of the entire Indian population
was part of Indian India, standing under indirect rule in states headed by
Indian rulers. Somewhere in history these Indian states had entered into treaty
alliances with the East India Company which had earned them a semi-
autonomous existence on the fringe of the emerging British-Indian empire.
They were allowed to maintain their own bureaucracies, to pass their own
laws and to levy their own taxes, but had to give up all control over their
external affairs. Strewn capriciously over the subcontinent, there were about
six hundred of them, the majority tiny and insignificant but some, like
Hyderabad with its own currency, post, railways and airline, much bigger
than Britain. It was the Political Department, exercising the functions of the
crown in its relations with Indian states, that held this motley collection of
6 P. Radhakrishnan, 'Communal Representation in Tamil Nadu, 1850-1916: The Pre-non-brahmin
Movement Phase', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXVIII, no. 31 (1993), p. 1568.
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princely states together.7 The Residents appointed by that department were
assigned with the delicate task to keep a watchful eye on the ruler's conduct
but at the same time to observe scrupulously their dignity and states'
traditions.
For people in the Indian states nationalism was a concept fraught with
ambivalence. After the violent Mutiny (1857) the British refrained from
further territorial annexations and decided to cultivate their relations with the
remaining rulers as a conservative bulwark against the rising nationalist tide
in British India. Feeling perfectly safe under protection by the British
paramount power, these Indian rulers showed no willingness to part with their
autocratic powers. Therefore, the political movements that emerged in the
states reflected the wish of local elites for responsible government and a
larger share in their own administration which was thought to be an
authoritarian, if not feudal preserve.8 Nationalism in that sense did not spread
from British India to the states as a one-way political process, as Robin
Jeffrey has asserted9, but largely sprang from local roots and circumstances.
As the states' administration was already in Indian hands, this movement
rallied Indians against Indians and offered fertile soil for the emergence of
communalism and its concomitant tensions and conflicts.
In my view, the distinctive characteristic of the phenomenon called
communalism is the belief that a group of people, because they have one
ascriptive identity in common, such as religion, language, also share common
interests in all other fields (political, economic). By placing all emphasis on
that shared cultural attribute, an earnest attempt is made to overcome a
disturbing internal diversity by postulating a higher but largely 'imagined
unity'.10 Depending on the selection of attributes, the imagined unity may
refer to the political community of a nation, but also to a religious, caste or
linguistic community.11 Defined in these broad terms communalism is not
something peculiar to South Asia and may be compared with similar social
phenomena studied elsewhere under different names like ethnicity, tribalism
or pillarisation. Led by the same wish to lift communalism out of its narrow
7 The Political Department, earlier Foreign and Political Department, produced the R/1 series of Crown
Representative's Records (Oriental and India Office Collections, London), whereas the Residency
Records in the R/2 series contain the files from the records kept locally by Residents and Political
Agents.
8 When in 1939 the government of India decided to support some of the weaker rulers with troops and
police, the struggle for responsible government may be said to have transformed into a direct struggle
against British imperialism.
9 Robin Jeffrey (ed.), People, Princes and Paramount Power: society and politics in the Indian Princely
States (New Delhi, 1978), p. 12.
10 Dick Kooiman, 'Communities and Electorates: a comparative discussion of communalism in colonial
India', Comparative Asian Studies, 16 (Amsterdam, 1995), p. 2.
11 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism
(London, 1983).
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THE STRENGTH OF NUMBERS 85
regional and cultural confines, Chakrabarty suggests that all these forms of
intolerance be called by the more general term 'racism'.12
Remarkably, the Indian states are generally seen as rather harmonious as
far as their communal relations are concerned. Judging from contemporary
sources, Copland concludes that the baneful impact of communalism was less
pronounced in princely India than in British India.13 The same view is held
by Sen who states that'... in Indian princely states of Hindu rajas and Muslim
nawabs in modern times, there was serious militancy from time to time, but
not so frequent and so many serious Hindu-Muslim riots'.14 Was
communalism something specific for British India and was it, as Jeffrey has
argued in the case of nationalism, something imported from outside?
The Report of the Indian Statutory Commission suggested in 1930 that
the comparative absence of communal strife in the Indian states might be
explained by political retardation. So long as people had no part in the
conduct of their own government, there was little for members of one
community to fear from the predominance of the other.15 Sen seems to follow
the same line of reasoning when he argues that with the gradual introduction
of divisive systems of elections and confrontational systems of government
based on majority rule, communal conflicts have become progressively more
frequent, also in the Indian states.16
A theory favoured by British officialdom was that the princely states
were theocracies in which expressions of religious orthodoxy were forbidden
and one religious group dominated the darbar.17 That theory absolutely fails
to convince, as one could easily argue the other way round: less privileged
groups might feel tempted to appeal to community symbols in an attempt to
share the power that they feel is unjustly denied to them, thus providing the
conditions that sooner or later lead to communal conflict. That is also the
position I want to take here. In substantiation of that point I will focus on the
fight waged by several disprivileged groups for proportional representation in
government services in Travancore, Baroda and Hyderabad.
1 2
 Chakrabarty, op. cit., pp. 144-5.
1 3
 Ian Copland, 'Communalism' in Princely India: the case of Hyderabad, 1930-1940, Modern Asian
Studies XXII, 4 (1988), p. 783.
14 S.R. Sen, 'Communal Riots: Anticipation, Containment and Prevention', Economic and Political
Weekly XXVIII, 15 (1993), p. 627.
1 5
 Report of the Indian Statutory Commission (London, 1930), Vol. I, p. 29.
1 6
 Sen, op. cit., pp. 627, 631.
1 7
 Quoted in Copland, op. cit. (1988), p. 811ff.
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II
Travancore was a Hindu state in the sense that the majority of its population
was Hindu. Another reason to call Travancore a Hindu state is that in the
eighteenth century one of its main founders, Martanda Varma, dedicated the
whole kingdom to the Sri Padmanabha temple in Trivandrum, reconstituting
it to a divinely sanctioned polity with the king as the vassal of his tutelary
deity.18 As the administration of the land revenues included the management
of many temples and temple properties, only caste Hindus were ritually
allowed to join the important Land Revenue Department. However, local
brahmans were few in number and led a secluded existence on their landed
estates. Therefore, the Travancore kings recruited a large number of foreign
brahmans, mainly from Tamilnadu and Maharashtra, to run the
administration.
This brahman preponderance in the services left several groups out
which in successive waves raised a claim to their rightful share in the
expanding administration. As early as in the 1880s Travancore students wrote
articles in periodicals published outside the state criticising their own
government for importing outsiders into the services in preference to the sons
of the soil. Resentment about what was felt to be official neglect led to the
famous Malayali Memorial (1891), asking the maharaja for a fair share in
government appointments for the local people. As the results of the 1891
Census were not yet available, the memorialists referred to the 1889
Travancore Almanac for their complaint that outsiders were overrepresented
in all services compared to their percentage of the population. Of the two
hundred and forty-six top appointments carrying more than Rs 50 per month,
foreign Hindus had one hundred and twenty as against local Hindus sixty-one.
The remaining sixty-five posts were held by Christians. The memorialists
argued that these groups were in no way 'entitled to play the Englishman in
this state!'19
The 1891 Memorial for the first time raised the demand for a
distribution of jobs on the basis of the numerical strength of each community.
This meant that numbers entered politics as a forceful argument, long before
there was any question of elections. Although the diwan (chief minister)
rejected any notion of a proportional distribution of appointments, it did not
prevent him from entering a vehement discussion about counting methods.
Apart from enumeration, communal distribution also implied the problem of
boundary demarcation. Hence memorialists and counter-memorialists made
vigorous but inconclusive attempts to define Malayalis, using their system of
inheritance or the particular way they wore their kudumi (tuft of hair) as
18 Susan Bayly, 'Hindu Kingship and the Origin of Community: religion, state and society in Kerala,
1750-1850', Modern Asian Studies, XVIII, 2 (1984), p. 189ff.
19 The Travancore (Malayali) Memorial, Madras Times, 8 July 1891.
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THE STRENGTH OF NUMBERS 87
possible boundary markers.20 I agree with Jeffrey and Suresh Kumar's more
explicit view that this Memorial heralded the birth of communal politics in
Travancore.21 Yet, whereas Jeffrey mentions numbers only as an instrument
meant to give the Memorial the more impressive appearance of a state-wide
movement22, in my view the more significant function of numbers was to
indicate the relative strength of separate communities within the state.
Among the groups whose political aspirations found expression in the
1891 Memorial were first of all the low caste ezhavas. In 1895 they submitted
a separate Memorial asking for the recruitment of more qualified ezhavas to
the services. A few years later, they established the SNDPYogam, one of the
first caste associations in India (1903). Christians were also involved in the
1891 Memorial. Travancore had an exceptional high percentage of them
(thirty-one and a half per cent in 1931), for the major part Syrians who trace
their origin back to the Apostle Thomas. The Syrian Christians enjoyed high
status and carefully kept their distance from the lower-caste Christians, who
were more recently converted by the numerous missionary societies working
in Travancore. Nevertheless, the main instigators of the 1891 Malayali
memorial were the nayars, an intermediate caste of landed warrior-aristocrats.
They were also the main beneficiaries. Supported by their long tradition of
literacy and government service, they silently found their way to promotion
and recognition.
After the First World War the Syrian Christians together with the
ezhavas organised a campaign for the opening of the public administration to
all castes and creeds. After much pressure the government finally acquiesced
in a separation of temple management from the Revenue Department, thus
removing the ritual barriers that had until then prevented all but brahmans
and nayars from entering this part of the services. This measure did not really
improve the situation. Therefore, in the 1920s, aggrieved groups resorted to
agitation against nayar predominance in the bureaucracy, and a Syrian
Christian spokesman warned that power might easily turn into tyranny, if the
various communities of the state were not duly represented.23 To press the
case of castewise representation detailed statistics were prepared that were
eagerly discussed in the Legislative Council.24
20
 Travancore Memorials and Counter Memorials, Madras Times, 8, 9, 10 July 1891.
21 Suresh Kumar, Political Evolution in Kerala: Travancore 1859-1938 (New Delhi, n.d.), p. 71; Robin
Jeffrey, The Decline of Nayar Dominance: society and politics in Travancore, 1847-1908 (New Delhi,
1976), pp. 166ff. Jeffrey's classic study has recently been reprinted by Manohar Publishers, New
Delhi.
22 Jeffrey, op. cit. (1976), p. 167.
2 3
 Report of the Travancore Public Service Recruitment Committee 1933 (Trivandrum, 1934), p. 11.
2 4
 Travancore Legislative Council, Proceedings, XV: 295, (1929) in State Legislative Library (SLL),
Trivandrum.
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In the 1930s numerical and communal classifications had become the
standard idiom of Travancore political discourse. From all sides statistics
were produced to claim political privilege on the sheer strength of number,
and communities were grouped or split accordingly. In 1934 the Report of the
Travancore Public Service Recruitment Committee brought to light that caste
Hindus still accounted for seventy-five per cent of government servants, three
times their share in the population, whereas ezhavas, as numerous as the
nayars, made up only three or four per cent. Christians held 16.6 per cent of
the jobs and the Muslim part was negligible. In the same year a Joint Political
Congress submitted a Memorial to the maharaja, presenting Travancore's
political problem primarily as a problem of numerical disproportions. Neat
tables were displayed, listing the different communities' share in population
and government service. The glaring imbalances thus disclosed, showing the
same trend as the government report, were presented as a self-evident
political program.25
To solve the problem of recruitment, the government committee had
recommended grouping the population into fourteen communal categories
and basing recruitment to the different grades of service on a mixture of
communal representation and merit. The recommendations raised a storm of
protest, especially after a defective version had leaked out through the press.
The wave of commotion especially affected the Christians, though not for the
same reasons. The more prominent Syrian Catholics objected to their
separation from the low-caste Latin Catholics as an invidious move to reduce
their share of Catholic appointments. Latin Catholics, in their turn, resented
the loss of status implied by their classification with the depressed classes.
And Congregationalists refused to be listed along with Anglicans. They
declared to fear loss of identity, but the local missionary had a different story
to tell: the Congregationalists feared that, if treated as one community, the
plums of office and appointment would be taken by the most advanced
section of the Anglican church which was Syrian.26
Echoes of the uproar in Travancore reached London, where it was
almost inevitably perceived as a threat to the local Christian community by
the Hindu government. Some personal letters to the Secretary of State in
London deliberately presented the question in those terms by complaining
that 'your brethren in Christianity are being persecuted like the Jews in
Germany'.27 Questions were asked in the British parliament whether Catholic
Christians in Travancore were classified and treated as depressed classes to
2 5
 Travancore: the Present Political Problem (Calicut, 1934).
2 6
 Account of Travancore Church Council meeting, Quilon, 1935, and letter by Eastaff, missionary
Trivandrum, 10 July 1935, in Council for World Mission Archives (School of Oriental and African
Studies, London), Travancore Correspondence, Box 33.
2 7
 Personal letter to Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for India, by M.N.Thomas and four million
others, Madras 17 Mar. 1934, in Oriental and India Office Collections (OIOC), L/P&S/13, 1291.
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THE STRENGTH OF NUMBERS 89
which the government could answer that the local converts themselves had
claimed the right to be considered a depressed category for purposes of
certain educational and other concessions.28
In 1935 the government of Travancore promulgated an order regulating
recruitment to the various classes of service and their communal proportion.
The principle of communal representation was accepted and for that purpose
the new rules recognised eight Hindu caste groups, the Muslims and six
Christian denominations. The Syrian and Latin Catholics were split into two
distinct categories and the classification of Christian converts along with
Hindus as Depressed Classes was abolished. The order introduced a three-tier
division of administrative service with, in the higher division, efficiency as
the primary criterion and in the lower division communal representation and
rotation. Even after promulgation of this order ezhavas, Muslims and low-
caste Christians kept complaining that the majority of key positions was still
falling to the brahmans, nayars and prominent Syrians. Resolutions were
moved in the Legislative Assembly urging the government to take steps to
guarantee that all important communities in the state were properly
represented in the secretariat. The heated discussions that continued to flare
up disclosed the deep-rooted communal bitterness that prevailed among the
various communities, but especially between Christians and nayars.29
m
Baroda, comprising a large part of the present Gujarat Province, was of
similar size to Travancore. It had a comparable Muslim minority, but its
Hindu majority was much larger (about eighty-eight per cent). The main
difference from Travancore in the state's religious complexion was the
negligible proportion of Christians.
Its formation also dates from the eighteenth century when the Gaekwads,
a conquering war-band from Maharashtra, started to build their influence in
this region. They defeated the local representatives of the Mughal empire, but
proved unable to establish an unchallenged independence from the larger
Maratha confederacy with its centre in the Deccan. When the British crushed
the last vestiges of Maratha power (1818), the Gaekwads were forced to
acknowledge British suzerainty.
Until far into the twentieth century Baroda offered a picture of overall
political and communal tranquillity. Gandhi's civil disobedience campaigns
starting from nearby Gujarat closely touched on Baroda's borders, but created
28 This answer was in fact a quotation from a note by the Government of Travancore, 10th March 1935,
OIOC, Crown Representative's Records (CRR), R/2(889/236).
29 Dick Kooiman, 'Political Rivalry among Religious Communities: a case study of communal
reservations in India', Economic and Political Weekly, XXVIII, 7 (1993), p. 292.
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only ripples on its political surface. But Baroda had a weak spot in its socio-
linguistic composition. Gujarati was the main language and only one and a
half per cent of the population spoke Marathi as its first language. The
concentration of this Marathi speaking minority in a few administrative
centres and district headquarters reflects the history of the State.
Maharashtrian brahmans, following in the wake of the Gaekwads' conquests,
used to dominate the top levels of the state bureaucracy.
However, from the end of the nineteenth century, education made
spectacular progress and in 1931 literacy had increased to twenty-one per cent
(thirteen per cent in British Gujarat). As a result, the higher ranks of the
Baroda administrative service were increasingly filled by Gujaratis.
According to the Census, from 1875 to 1921 the Marathi share in the number
of gazetted government officials had fallen from sixty-four to seventeen per
cent, whereas the share of Gujarati Hindus and Jains had increased from
twenty-four to sixty-two and a half per cent. The percentage of the Gujarati
Muslims in the corresponding period had increased from two to fourteen per
cent.30
In Baroda there were few demands for a more responsible system of
government, and the distribution of appointments was not as eagerly watched
as in Travancore. Hardiman explains this comparative peace by pointing at
the large number of Gujarati patidars, the dominant landlord-cultivators, who
after some form of schooling had smoothly settled in the bureaucracy, thus
avoiding the usual conflict of new-administrators-ver.sM.s'-local-nobility.31
Nevertheless, Hardiman underestimates the resentment many Gujaratis seem
to have felt at what they considered to be an official neglect of their
community by the Baroda government. In 1930s there grew at least a latent
sympathy for the Indian National Congress among Gujarati Hindus who
proved receptive to the slogan 'Gujarat for Gujaratis' associated with
Congress policies. And with the approach of an Indian federation as devised
by the 1935 Constitution, Congress began to show more interest in the affairs
of the princely states. The Haripura Congress (1938) decided for the first
time to support, at least to a certain extent, movements in the states asking for
responsible government. Maratha officials, the British Resident wrote, felt
uneasy about this growing sentiment.32
30 Figures for 1875 are derived from David Hardiman, 'Baroda: The Structure of a 'Progressive State, in:
Robin Jeffrey (ed.), People, Princes and Paramount Power: society and politics in the Indian Princely
States (New Delhi, 1978), pp. 118-19, but my own counts from the 1921 census differ from his. I
have included Prabhus in the Marathi speaking category, since successive census reports describe them
as immigrants from the Deccan.
31
 Hardiman, op. cit., p. 119ff.
3 2
 Fortnightly Report (FR) from Baroda for the second half of Feb. 1932, OIOC, L/P&S/13/1007.
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That feeling of uneasiness only grew. At the 1938 session of the Baroda
Praja Mandal (People's Association), the Congress stalwart Sardar V. Patel
managed to gain the leadership. In his presidential address he touched upon
the sensitive issue of official employment by complaining that outsiders had
been imported into the state and sons of the soil kept out of the
administration. It was time, the Sardar concluded, that the voice of the people
was heard and responsible government established.33 The Praja Mandal had
issued a pamphlet on the employment question and at the same meeting one
of the secretaries read out from that pamphlet, that of the two hundred and
eighteen top officers drawing a salary of Rs 300 or more per month seventy-
one belonged to the state whereas one hundred and forty-seven were
outsiders.34 Without saying so explicitly, we may infer from his words that
those who 'belonged' were Gujaratis and the outsiders were Marathis. The
1931 Census figures, for all their shortcomings, also showed that over the last
decade the Marathi share of top level appointments had increased from
seventeen per cent to twenty-four per cent, but this growth was largely
achieved at the cost of the Muslims.35
In an open letter to The Times of India on 20 January 1939, B.Z.
Panwala from Baroda countered that criticism. Entering upon the complicated
problem of boundary demarcation, he contended that as many as twenty-five
officers of the state had been wrongly described as outsiders. Also, drawing
the line on the state service list at the lower level of Rs 100 per month, he
pointed out that sixty per cent of the officers were Gujaratis; the remaining
posts were occupied by Maharashtrians together with Parsis, Muslims and
others. Marathis, according to him, preponderated only in the army and the
household departments, while in the lower servives Gujaratis were alleged to
claim more than eighty per cent of the posts.
When Patel visited Baroda city on the same 20 January, things came to a
head dramatically. The Sardar was not popular among the Marathis and
Muslims, and a general impression prevailed, spread by the Marathi press,
that Patel as a Gujarati was bitterly opposed to the maharaja and his
government. His tour through the city resulted in black flags along the route
and the pandal erected for his reception by the Praja Mandal was destroyed.
A terrorised Patel hid in the car and drove away as fast as he could.36 The
general meeting had to be postponed but his soothing words the next day did
not have the desired result. Large-scale violence broke out and local
3 3
 Bombay Chronicle, 30 Oct. 1938.
3 4
 Sessions of the Prajamandal Meetings 1928-39, Huzur Political Office (HPO), Baroda, Confidential
File No. 129.
3 5
 Census of India 1921, Vol. 17, Baroda State (Bombay, 1921), Part II, p. 114-21 and Census of India
1931, Vol. 19, Baroda State (Bombay, 1932), Part II, pp. 78-83.
36 Ian Copland, 'Congress Paternalism: the 'High Command' and the struggle for freedom in Princely
India, c. 1920-1940', South Asia, VIII, 1-2 (1985), p. 130.
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millhands, who were mainly Marathis and Muslims, joined the fighting,
leaving many injured and one Maratha killed. During the riots a Marathi
pamphlet circulated in the city stating that in the state services Gujaratis and
Maharasthrians were employed without any partiality.37
In an open letter to The Hindustan Times on 28 January 1939 Sardar
Patel tried to explain his position. Since the communal tension that had
erupted in Baroda city was mainly attributed to his comments on the admin-
istrative services, he wanted to repeat that it was the people who claimed
responsible government. Since the people 'could never be satisfied with a
system under which most offices of responsibility were filled by people
coming from outside Baroda State', they should insist on having them filled
by local residents. At the same time, the Baroda diwan tried to prevent a
public enquiry into the January riots. His argument was that publication of
the available evidence would only result in increased bitterness between the
communities and would hamper the common struggle of Gujaratis and
Maharashtrians for the independence of India. The enquiry was dropped.38
IV
In the second half of the eighteenth century Hyderabad state was forced to
accept Company military assistance in exchange for vast tracts of territory.
This state, occupying almost the centre of the Deccan plateau, was carved out
of the crumbling Mughal empire by a distinguished general who established
the Asaf Jha dynasty. Yet, in spite of this dynasty's explicit assertion of
independence, Mughal authority continued to be the source of symbolic
legitimacy for the state.39 The ideology of a Muslim state permeated the
whole administration and E.M. Forster, coming from Dewas, wrote that he
'passed abruptly from Hinduism to Islam' adding that 'the change [was] a
relief'.40
Nevertheless, Hyderabad held a much higher percentage of Hindus than
Travancore: in 1931 eighty-four per cent. Muslims numbered no more than
ten per cent of the population. Being to a large extent associated with the
different branches of administration, they were over-represented in the urban
population.4! For a long time communal relations created no serious
3 7
 Report on the disturbances in Baroda from 20 to 22 Jan. 1939, by Sir V.T. Krishnamachari Dīwān, in
HPO Baroda, Confidential File No. 134 and OIOC R/1/1/3282.
3 8
 Disturbances Baroda City 1939, in HPO, Baroda, Confidential File No. 134.
39
 Karen Leonard, 'The Hyderabad Political System and its Participants', The Journal of Asian Studies,
Vol. XXX, no. 3 (1971), p. 570.
4 0
 E.M. Forster, The Hill of Devi and Other Indian Writings (London, 1983), p.98.
41 The Muslim share of urban population was thirty-two per cent, the capital Hyderabad City numbering
even forty-one per cent, Census of India 1931, Vol. 23, H.E.H. the Nizam's Dominions (Hyderabad,
1933) Part I, pp. 232, 245.
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problems. First of all, Hindus and Muslims presented no solid monolithic
blocs, but were internally divided by caste, language and sect. That apart,
some non-Muslims managed to obtain leading positions, and government
tried, wherever possible, to respect Hindu sensibilities. Also, the
maladministration, regularly criticised by British Residents, may have created
some solidarity among the victims, as Muslims and Hindus suffered alike
from the nizam's various schemes for extortion.42
According to Karen Leonard, the main problem in Hyderabad politics
before independence was not the relation between Hindus and Muslims, but
between mulkis (locals) and non-mulkis (outsiders). After the Mutiny (1857),
trained Indian personnel was brought in from British India to improve the
administration, but only Hyderabadis remained entrusted with the most
important political responsibilities. From 1886, however, the Hyderabad Civil
Lists show a steady increase in the number of non-mulkis in prominent
positions. By the turn of the century this increase had led to an unmistakable
statistical domination.43 Of course, there was the inevitable tussle about
definitions which was not definitely solved by government orders defining
non-mulki as a transitional category. Slightly at variance with Leonard's
thesis, I would like to submit the proposition that with independence drawing
near the mulki versus non-mulki issue was gradually subsumed by a larger
Hindu-Muslim divide. The majority Hindu population began to challenge its
marginal position in the State's public life, especially its underrepresentation
in the administrative services.
During the first half of this century Muslims benefited disproportionally
from the expansion of the state's educational institutions. The Hyderabad
general rate of literacy remained low, no more than five per cent of the
population in 1931, far below that of Travancore and Baroda. Yet, from 1881
literacy among Muslims more than doubled, while that for Hindus increased
by 0.4 per cent only. According to Leonard, the educational gap between
mulkis and non-mulkis began to close. Another conclusion must be that the
gap between Muslims and Hindus grew wider.44
In spite of an increasing association between mulkis and non-mulkis, also
manifested in inter-marriage patterns, relations among Muslims were not
altogether free from tension. Aligarh in North India continued to supply
Hyderabad with more government servants than did local institutions,
illustrating the continuing dominance of the original non-mulki
administrators.45 Hyderabad, the Resident wrote, lacked leaders of sufficient
4 2
 Memorandum by William Barton, Resident, 11 Dec. 1925, OIOC, R/1/1/1465(1).
4 3
 Karen Leonard, 'Hyderabad: the Mulki-Non-Mulki Conflict', in Robin Jeffrey (ed.), People, Princes
and Paramount Power: society and politics in the Indian Princely States (New Delhi, 1978), pp. 75ff.
4 4
 Leonard, op. cit. 1978, p. 80.
45 Ibid., 1978, p. 85.
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stature and therefore, non-mulkis could argue that Hyderabad must continue
to draw men from Upper India.46 But another disadvantage was becoming
more important: these foreigners brought with them many ties to the religious
and political movements of North India which were increasingly divided
along communal lines.47
One of the last voices raised against these imported government servants
was that of Abid Hasan. In 1935 he had established the Mulki League, the
main objectives of which were the introduction of responsible government
and the reservation of the services to sons of the soil. In his Whither
Hyderabad?, he made extensive use of the 1931 Census tables to show that
educated employment was seized upon by immigrants from UP and Punjab
who 'suffer from an unpardonable superiority complex... [and] act not as the
servants but as the rulers of the state'.48 As both Muslims from north India
and Hindus from neighbouring British provinces were creating communal
dissensions within Hyderabad, the author argued that capable mulkis ought to
be found for every administrative and technical post, or that at least they
ought to be given the chance to learn by experience. This undisguised
challenge of all outside influence was embarrassing even for the Mulki
League, and Hasan had to retire.
Recruitment to the services remained the dominant theme, but the
communal boundary was increasingly drawn along the line of religion.
Muslims controlled the government and enjoyed a disproportionate share of
gazetted appointments: eight hundred and sixty-four out of a total of one
thousand two hundred and twenty-one officers, or more than seventy per
cent, leaving the rest to Hindus, Christians and Parsis. A Hindu communalist
paper from Poona used these 1931 Census data to bring home to the Hindu
public that their proportion of higher posts to population share was 0.002
only as against 0.06 for the Muslims.49 But on the other hand, Hindus were
well represented in the professions and dominated agriculture, trading and
banking. The 1931 Census did not even mention trade as an occupation
followed by Muslims.50 For that reason, the darbar tended to consider the
Muslim hold on the public services as a kind of justified compensation: since
Hindus owned most of the private wealth of the State, 'there are few ways of
livelihood left open to the Muslims except Government service...'.51 And
even there, they had to face Hindu competition.
4 6
 Secret Note by D.G. Mackenzie, Resident, 14 Jan. 1937, in OIOC, L/P&S/13/1200.
4 7
 S.R. Ashton, British Policy towards the Indian States 1905-1939 (London, 1982), p. 87.
48
 Syed Abid Hasan, Whither Hyderabad? (A brief study of some of the outstanding problems of the
Premier Indian State) (Madras, 1935), p. 44.
49
 Mahratta, 10 Mar. 1939.
5 0
 Hasan, op. cit., p. 75; Copland, op. cit. 1988, p. 789.
5 1
 Quoted in Copland, op. cit. 1988, p. 789-90.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
8:
36
 8
 J
un
e 
20
11
THE STRENGTH OF NUMBERS 95
The Deccan Times on 22 May 1938 took another line in defence of the
Muslims. It pointed out that in Hyderabad and everywhere else government
service, just like agriculture and industry, belonged to certain groups that
possessed 'special flair' for that particular occupation. In Hyderabad,
Muslims and brahmans were the two chief communities furnishing candidates
for government service for generations. Brahmans constituted a negligible
minority of two per cent, but held twenty per cent of gazetted offices and
forty per cent of others. These brahmans who subjected Untouchables to
inhuman treatment could not claim to represent the eighty-four per cent
Hindus of the state. That claim, the paper wrote, would be tantamount to the
ridiculous assertion that an eighty-four per cent representation in service
should be reserved for them! The Hindu Mahasabha and Arya Samaj were
denounced as exponents of this creed of brahman hegemony, which they were
able to propagate because of the undue tolerance and leniency of the
Hyderabad government.
In the 1930s tensions increased. There had been earlier communal
disturbances, but in the late 1930s tensions came to a climax. Political
associations, both inside but usually outside state territory, declared their
unswerving loyalty to the nizam, but also requested the early introduction of
political reforms. Branches of the Praja Mandal and National Congress were
not in a flourishing condition, but in 1938 a Hyderabad State Congress (HSC)
was formed for the attainment of responsible government under the aegis of
the nizam by all peaceful and legitimate means.52 The HSC condemned all
forms of communalism and insisted that both majority and minority had a
duty of establishing confidence and mutual co-operation. Nevertheless,
resistance to government autocracy took a religious turn and Muslims were
not eager to join. When in 1938 the HSC launched satyagraha, the Arya
Samaj and Hindu Mahasabha started similar campaigns, posing as champions
of the people by their demand for more democracy.53 The involvement of
communal elements in the satyagraha and even in the HSC itself led to an
official ban on the HSC, since government was
confirmed in its conviction that the movement, ostensibly
political, [was] in fact a cloak for subversive, communal
activities to which the prestige of the name 'Congress' has
been deliberately attached for misleading the public.54
52 The Struggle for Freedom in Hyderabad State, printed pamphlet (no place, 1938), pp. 19-21.
53 Swami Ramananda Tirtha, Memoirs of Hyderabad Freedom Struggle (Bombay, 1967), pp. 66ff.
54 Text of government ban in The Struggle for Freedom in Hyderabad State (no place, 1938), pp. 29-30.
Further explanation was given by the Chief Minister's address to the Legislative, 23 Aug. 1938,
OIOC, L/P&S/13/1200.
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To lift the ban, communal leaders like Bahadur Yar Jung and Narsingha Rao
started talks about the percentages of reservations for both communities in the
services and the Legislative, but they remained inconclusive.55
Growing Congress interest in the states after its Haripura session and the
approaching federation also made government view the HSC with alarm. The
HSC, and Hindus generally, favoured the idea of federation, whereas
Muslims and the nizam's government regarded any transfer of power from
the ruling class to more representative institutions as the passing of power
into Hindu hands. These apprehensions, largely fed by a straight application
of numbers, are very clear in Bahadur Yar Jung's presidential address to the
1940 session of the Majlis-i-Ittihad-ul-Muslimin. He denounced democracy as
'a counting of heads' and attributed Hindu fondness for that system to their
wish to recapture power from the Muslims by their sheer weight of numbers.
But the Western concept of democracy cannot possibly be applied to India,
according to Yar Jung, as majority and minority have been fixed in the terms
of Census figures which makes the Muslim minority a constant victim. He
declared that Muslims would not tolerate any system which tended in the
guise of democracy to hand over power to the Hindu majority.56 The
incorporation of Hyderabad into the larger Indian Union had to take place by
force of arms.
What becomes apparent in this short essay on the enumeration of
communities is the great deal of similarity that exists between the situation in
the princely states and British India. Although nationalist discourse tends to
connect the growth of communalism with British colonial policies - which as
a matter of fact were much more prominent in the provinces than in the states
- there seem to have been more fundamental factors at work. In both cases, a
steady increase in number and size of government departments led to a
demand for skilled personnel, which was not difficult to fulfil since the
numerous products of modern education stood eagerly waiting outside the
gates of government establishment. In British India the fierce competition for
government employment not only stimulated a national movement, but
ultimately came to split Indian ranks by mutual rivalry for position. In the
states the same demand placed Indians in direct opposition against their own
government. Therefore, political developments in the states may have
5 5
 Resumé of events in Indian States for this period, in OIOC, L/P&S/13/1200 File 1(2). See also N.
Ramesan (ed.), The Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad (published by the Andhra Pradesh State
Committee appointed for the compilation of a history of the Freedom Struggle in Andhra Pradesh,
1966), Vol.IV, pp. 139ff.
5 6
 Full text of Bahadur Yar Jung's Presidential Address, Jan. 1940, in OIOC, L/P&S/13/1201, File 1(3).
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suffered from retardation, but any hint of a political devolution immediately
made communal battle lines to be drawn.
In Travancore, Baroda and Hyderabad, political struggle was first aimed
at a reservation of government jobs for sons of the soil. In this struggle the
new, educated administrators imported from other parts of India, whether
brahmans or Muslims, played more or less the same part as the white sahib in
the British provinces. With their arrogance and superiority complex, they
were seen as 'brown British', acting as rulers more than servants of the state.
At first, the sons of the soil were loosely defined in broad categories as
Malayan's, Gujaratis and mulkis, but later they were diversified into finer
subdivisions of religion and caste. In this atmosphere of rivalry and distrust
communalism could and did emerge. The Diwan of Travancore was of the
opinion that his people were much more inclined to think in terms of
communal identities than was usual in British India, and Jeffrey agrees by
stating that communal politics in Travancore were among the bitterest in
India.57 That the strong communal feelings in this state produced hardly any
violence suggests a level of sophistication which requires further explanation.
In the hunt for a larger share of government appointments number
became an important argument. Communal feelings were sharpened in this
process, not so much by the impact of British direct rule as by their
techniques of measurement which the states imported as an external resource.
In Census, Almanacs, Civil Lists and many administration reports, separate
Hindu, Muslim and Christian identities were constructed not just into
Anderson's well-known imagined communities but also and more directly
into enumerated communities.58 However, the official categories did not
always work, at least not for long. Affirmative action by underlying groups
could lead to further proliferation breaking the official constructions, a
process similar to the growing subdivision of the Other Backward Classes
category in India today. Therefore, enumeration stimulated the formation of
collective identities, but communities also counted their own numbers and
drew what they considered to be their own boundaries.
It was not necessary to import communalism from British India into the
states, particularly not in Travancore and Hyderabad, where conditions for
that kind of social tension had matured long before the twentieth century.
However, it was certainly encouraged by the 1935 Government of India Act
and the concept of federation embodied by it. This globalisation at the level
of a subcontinent created a lot of uncertainty about one's place in a larger
57 Note on a discussion between Sir C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar, Diwan, and Sir Bertrand Glancy, Secretary
to the Political Department, 1938, OIOC, L/P&S/13, 1283; Jeffrey, op. cit., p. 24.
58 Arjun Appadurai, 'Number in the Colonial Imagination', in Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der
Veer (eds), Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament (Philadelphia, 1993).
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Indian Union which made people cling to identities of religion and caste also
beyond the narrow borders of their own state.
Finally, the strong sense of numbers thwarted the introduction of
democratic forms of government. Democracy was perceived not as an
instrument for the creation of a more responsible society but as a system of
government that assigns permanent power to the group largest in number.
India is still grappling with that problem.
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